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Political conservativism has been associated with lower cognitive ability, including lower 
numeracy (math ability) and higher perceptions of their own ability including higher perceived 
math ability (numeric self-efficacy). It has been suggested that this is evidence of overconfidence 
on the part of conservatives, but conservatism has not been linked with overconfidence per se. In 
the current research, we investigated correlations of political conservatism with cognitive ability, 
self-efficacy, and measures of overconfidence, including overestimation of the number of items 
correctly answered on a test of numeracy and over placement of math ability relative to others. 
We also measured additional ability measures, education, general self-efficacy, and narcissism (a 
general measure of overconfidence). Cognitive ability was operationalized through a basic 
mathematics test, spatial reasoning, and a basic vocabulary test. Each ability variable was 
correlated with one another, and a standardized ability variable was created. We used a sample of 
N= 831 MTurk workers recruited from Cloud Research. We found only ability, self-efficacy, 
numeric efficacy (i.e., not measures of overconfidence) predicted ideology. In an exploratory 
regression using measures of numeric confidence, narcissism, general self-efficacy, cognitive 
ability, and education, greater conservatism was associated with lower ability, b(se)= −0.166 
(0.057), p=.004, higher general self-efficacy, b(se)= 0.171 (0.051), p=.001, and higher 
subjective numeracy b(se)= 0.080 (0.037), p=.033. Based on these findings, we suggest the 
relationship between political ideology and numeracy is better stated as an issue of confidence 
rather than overconfidence. It appears that conservatives have generally high efficacy, but when 
asked to give specific judgments about their ability, they do not systematically overestimate it.  
 
Introduction 
Previous theory has considered an association between greater liberalism and higher 
education. For instance, one study found that education can interact with openness to facilitate 
more liberal views (Dunn, 2011). Another found that education weakens support of the church, 
law enforcement, and the military (Weakliem, 2002). Generally, the liberal attitudes of most 
universities are believed to decrease right-wing and authoritarian views while increasing more 
progressive attitudes (Van Hiel et al., 2010).  
Consistent with the link between education and ideology, other investigations have 
uncovered a link between political ideology and cognitive ability. Specifically, studies have 
found negative associations between cognitive ability and both right-wing ideology and 
conservatism. In fact, a meta-analysis of 92 studies showed a consistent link between higher 
conservatism and right-wing ideologies such as dogmatism and authoritarianism and lower 
cognitive abilities such as intelligence, reasoning tasks, and years of education (Van Hiel et al., 
2010). Another study found that conservatives had worse SAT scores and performed worse on 
vocab and analogy tests (Stankov, 2009).  
Of greatest interest to the current investigation, researchers found that conservatives 
tended to overperceive their math ability (i.e., subjective numeracy) but underperformed on an 
objective test of math ability (i.e., objective numeracy; Choma et al., 2019).  
The earlier research suggests that conservatives might be overconfident because 
conservatism simultaneously predicted lower ability and higher perceptions in that ability. 
However, the earlier research did not test this directly. People can have specific overconfident 
beliefs, such as overestimating their actual performance (i.e., overestimation), placing 
themselves too highly relative to other individuals (i.e., over-placement), and having undue 
certainty regarding beliefs (i.e., over-precision; Moore & Healy, 2008).  
We also were interested in links between conservatism and other individual differences that have 
been associated with overconfidence, such as general self-efficacy and the Dark Triad. General 
self-efficacy involves an individual’s belief in whether they can accomplish a certain act 
(Bandura, 1977). Higher self-efficacy has been associated with overconfidence in decision tasks 
(Stone, 1994). Likewise, Dark Triad variables have been linked to overconfidence. First, higher 
narcissism was related to overconfidence in betting (Campbell, et al., 2004). Second, 
Machiavellianism was linked to overconfidence in World Cup tournament predictions such that 
those higher in Machiavellianism had greater confidence but lower accuracy in their predictions 
(Jain & Bearden, 2011). 
Present Study  
Thus, if it is the case that conservatives are generally overconfident, we hypothesized that 
they may also have overconfident beliefs about their abilities, greater self-efficacy, and higher 
narcissism or Machiavellianism. 
In the current study, we used a large convenience sample to replicate and extend the past 
research. We investigated the following research questions: 
Hypothesis 1a: greater conservatism would be associated with greater perceived ability 
and lower actual ability, as in prior research (Choma et al., 2019). 
Hypothesis 1b: greater conservatism would be associated with greater overestimation and 
over-placement.  
Hypothesis 2a: greater conservatism would be associated with greater self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 2b: greater conservatism would be associated with greater narcissism and 
Machiavellianism. 
Methods 
The analysis was conducted on a previously collected data set from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Participants took two surveys. They received $2.50 for completion of the first 
and $1.50 for completion of the second.  
Of the 1054 (N=1054) responders, 831 (N=831) qualified for inclusion in the analysis by 
providing full data to both surveys, passing attention checks, and finishing the survey in an 
appropriate amount of time. The qualified participants were predominantly white (79.5%) with 
slightly more female responders than male (55.5% and 44.5%). The mean age was 40.4, there 
was a minimum age of 19, a maximum age of 79, and a standard deviation of 12.1 years.   
Participants answered questions regarding cognitive ability, confidence, political 
ideology, and demographics in an initial survey, and the Dark Triad and general self-efficacy in a 
separate survey several weeks later.  
Measures  
General political ideology  
We asked people to identify their political ideology through a 5-point scale: 1 (very 
libera), 2 (liberal), 3 (moderate), 4 (conservative), 5 (very conservative) (Jost, 2006).  
Education 
Participants were asked to identify the highest degree they earned. This included several 
options: 1 (less than high school), 2 (some high school), 3 (high school degree/ GED), 4 (2-year 
college degree), 5 (4-year college degree), 6 (Masters), 7 (Doctoral/MD, JD, PhD, etc.).  
Measures of Cognitive Ability  
General cognitive ability was operationalized through spatial reasoning (Ravens), vocab 
proficiency (Vocab), and objective numeracy (ONS).  
Spatial Reasoning (Ravens) 
 Raven’s matrices, originally developed as a component of general cognitive ability, have 
shown to be a valid measure of spatial reasoning (Raven, 2000; Schweizer, et al., 2007). 
According to Raven (1948), these matrices can test someone’s ability to make comparison, 
capacity for analogy, and use of logic without previously required knowledge. Performance on 
Raven’s matrices is strongly associated with inductive reasoning (Burke, 1958). Participants 
were presented with 10 different, incomplete visual patterns and then asked to choose between 1 
of 6 to 8 pieces that correctly completed each one. The spatial reasoning score was the sum of 
correctly answered questions (out of 10).  
Vocab Proficiency (Vocab)  
This section was intended to measure basic vocabulary and literacy. In a 12-item section, 
participants were given a word and two potential synonyms and then asked to select the correct 
one. For instance, participants were asked if “jovial” was more like “wise” or “jolly.” Correct 
answers were summed to form a measure of vocab proficiency.  The vocab score was the sum of 
correctly answered questions (out of 12) (Ekstrom & Harman, 1976).  
Objective Numeracy 
Like objective numeracy in the previous study, this was a series of 7 basic mathematics 
problems involving fractions and percentages and one attention check for a total of 8 questions in 
this section. The items we used have been derived from and validated in prior research (Cokely 
et al., 2012; Weller et al., 2013). Because many of the original items are searchable online, we 
changed the wordings of the problems. Correct answers were given a score of 1, incorrect 
answers were given a score of 0. The total number of correct answers yielded the objective 
numeracy scale. An example question includes “In a fast-food sweep stakes, the chance of 
winning a $5 gift card with the purchase of a soft drink is 1%. What is your best guess about how 
many people would win a 5$ gift care if 1,000 people each buy a single soft drink?” The 
objective numeracy score was the sum of correctly answered questions (out of 7).  
General Cognitive Ability  
For our measure of general cognitive ability, we standardized and averaged the 
component measures, which were intercorrelated. ONS correlated with Ravens (r =.382, p =.05) 
and Vocab (r =.243, p =.05). Ravens and Vocab were significantly correlated as well (r =.196, p 
= .05). Ravens and ONS are measures of fluid intelligence; vocabulary is a measure of 
crystallized intelligence (McGrew, 2009).  
Confidence Measures 
Confidence was operationalized through overestimation, over-placement, general self-
efficacy, and subjective numeracy.  
Overestimation of Objective Numeracy 
As defined in prior literature, overestimation is the difference between the number of 
correct answers vs. expected number of correct answers (Moore & Healy, 2008). Out of the 8 
questions, including an attention check, participants were asked “how many of those questions 
do you think you answered correctly?” To calculate overestimation, we subtracted the number of 
correct answers on the to the objective numeracy test from the number of estimated correct 
answers. A positive difference meant the participants overestimated their score while negative 
difference meant they underestimated that score. No difference meant they had accurately 
anticipated their score.  
Over-placement 
We included a measure of self-placement of math ability relative to the general 
population (Moore & Healy, 2008). Participants were asked a single item: “For the following 
question, please give a percentile score between 0 and 100, where 0 means everyone is better 
than you, 50 means you are better than half the other people, and 100 means you are better than 
everyone else. Compared to the average person, how would you rate your math ability?” This 
question was then answered using a slider from 0 to 100.  
General self-efficacy 
Derived from a validated scale, our participants answered a 5-question Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) for their personal rating of general self-
efficacy (Chen et al., 2001). An example question would include the following: “I will be able to 
achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself.” Participants scores were averaged for these 
5 questions to produce an overall general self-efficacy score. Higher scores indicate higher 
general self-efficacy.  
Subjective Numeracy 
Subjective numeracy is an individual’s perception of their own numeric comfort and 
capacity. Participants were asked to rate their ability to work with fractions and percentages in a 
4-question, 6-point scale from 1 (not at all good) to 6 (extremely good) (Fagerlin et al., 2007). 
An example question includes, “How good are you at working with fractions?” Subjective 
numeracy scores were the average across the four questions with higher numbers indicating 
higher subjective numeracy. 
Dark Triad Personality  
The Dark Triad of Personality consists of Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and 
Psychopathology. Each was measured using four questions, and scores on each subscale were 
averaged individually (Jonason & Webster, 2010). Ends points of Likert scale ranged from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater Dark Triad subscale 
scores.   
Narcissistic people seek prestige and admiration. Survey examples include “I tend to 
want others to pay attention to me” or “I tend to seek prestige or status.” Machiavellianism is a 
trait characterized by deceit and manipulation. Example statements include “I tend to exploit 
others towards my own end” or “I use flattery to get my way.” Psychopathology is a trait that is 
synonymous with callousness and insensitivity. On the survey, it is measured through statements 
such as “I tend to lack remorse,” or “I tend to be cynical.”  
 
Results 
All of the following data was analyzed with SPSS IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, 
Version 27.0. 
Table 1. Correlation table including confidence, cognitive ability, and political ideology. All variables are 
continuous. *p<.05. **p<.001.  
Variable 1      2     3     4      5       6      7       8     9    10 
1 Political Ideology  1          
2 ONS -.08* 1         
3 Ravens  -.06 .38** 1        
4 Vocab -.08* .24** .20** 1       
5 Cognitive Ability  -.10** .75** .73** .67** 1      
6 Education  -.02 .24** .05 .13** .19** 1     
7 SNS .06 .38** .15** .12** .30** .22** 1    
8 Overestimation ONS .07* -.34** -.07* -.06 -.22** -.01 .18** 1   
9 Over-placement  .00 .53** .26** .15** .43** .25** .61** .34** 1  




Over half of participants identified as liberal: very liberal (17.8%) and liberal (34.4%); 
about a quarter of participants identified as moderate (24.9%); less than a quarter identified as 
conservative: conservative (18.2%) and very conservative (4.7%). 
Greater conservative ideology was associated with lower ONS (r = -.077, p =.05), Vocab 
(r = -.076, p =.05), and Cognitive Ability (r = -.099, p =.05) although the Ravens scores by 
themselves were not significantly correlated with ideology (r = -.060, p =.05). There was no 
relationship between education (r = -.020, p =.05) and political ideology.  
More conservative participants had greater general self-efficacy (r = .146, p =.05) and 
overestimation (r = .074, p =.05), but not greater SNS (r = .062, p =.05) or over-placement (r = 
.004, p =.05). Additional correlations are included in Table 1. 
Test of Hypothesis 1a and 1b: Predicting ideology from numeracy-related ability, efficacy, 
and overconfidence variables 
Table 2. Starting and final models predicting political ideology from key variables. 
Unstandardized betas are reported with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are 
continuous.  
 Starting model  Final model   


























Model fit F (4, 826) =3.368   .010 F (2, 828) =6.584 .001 
Adjusted R2 .01  .01  
 
To parallel Choma and colleague’s (2019) analysis, we ran a similar multiple regression 
to predict ideology (Hypothesis 1a), but with the addition of numeric overconfidence variables 
(Hypothesis 1b). We included these variables in a single model because they were specific to 
numeracy. Starting variables included overestimation, over-placement, SNS, and ONS. Our final 
model results replicate past research (Choma et al., 2019).  
As predicted in Hypothesis 1a, greater conservatism was associated with lower objective 
numeracy, b(se)= -0.075 (0.02), p=.002, but higher subjective numeracy, b(se)= 0.107 (0.037), 
p<.004. All other variables were not retained as predictors (starting and final models in Table 2). 
Thus, we did not find support for Hypothesis 1b. 
Test of Hypothesis 2a and 2b: Predicting ideology from general ability, efficacy, and 
overconfidence variables 
Table 3. Starting and final models predicting political ideology from key variables. Unstandardized betas 
are reported with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are continuous.  
 Starting model  Final model   
 b(se) p b(se) p 
Constant 1.73 (0.30) <.001   
Education  −0.02 (0.04) .645   
Ability  −0.15 (0.07) .026 -0.17 (0.06) .004 
Overestimation 






0.08 (0.04)                     
 
.033 
Over-placement  -0.00 (0.00) .791   


















Model fit F (9, 821) =3.910  <.001 F (4, 826) =7.967  <.001 
Adjusted R2 .03  .03  
We conducted a second regression to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b that included more 
general measures of ability (i.e., our general cognitive ability measure and education), self-
efficacy (i.e., SNS and general self-efficacy), and overconfidence (overestimation and over-
placement in math ability and Dark Triad measures).  
In the final model (Table 3), greater conservatism was associated with lower ability, 
b(se)= −0.166 (0.057), p=.004, greater general self-efficacy, b(se)= 0.171 (0.051), p=.001, and 
lower subjective numeracy b(se)= 0.080 (0.037), p=.033. Narcissism was unexpectedly related 
to higher liberalism, b(se)= −0.06 (0.029), p=.036. All other variables were not retained as 
predictors (starting and final models in Table 3).  
We predicted greater conservatism would be associated with greater self-efficacy 
(Hypothesis 2a), which was confirmed. However, we did not observe the expected links between 
ideology and Narcissism and Machiavellianism (Hypothesis 2b).  
Discussion 
In two analyses, we found consistent evidence that lower cognitive ability and greater 
self-efficacy is associated with greater political conservatism. While this suggests there might be 
a link between ideology and other measures of overconfidence, we found no link for four 
different constructs related to overconfidence (i.e., overestimation, over-placement, Narcissism, 
and Machiavellianism). 
The results replicate prior research for both specific measures of ONS and SNS (i.e., Choma et 
al., 2019) as well as general measures of cognitive ability (Stankov 2009; Van Hiel et al., 2010). 
With just ONS, SNS, over-placement, and overestimation in the regression for political ideology, 
only ONS and SNS were retained as predictors. Conservatives had higher subjective numeracy 
but lower objective scores. In the more comprehensive regression, a similar trend was observed.  
We also anticipated a relationship between ideology and education for several reasons. 
First, prior research has found a relationship between ideology and education (Weakliem, 2002; 
Dunn, 2011). Also, lower cognitive ability was retained as a predictor for conservative ideology, 
so we thought this relationship might be driven by education.  However, education was not found 
to be a significant predictor of ideology. Our inability to replicate might have something to do 
with our education variable. We asked participants about the highest degree in which they 
achieved but not about degree type (i.e., MBA vs. MSW etc.). Had we done so, it is possible that 
certain types of advanced degrees are more associated with political ideology than others. 
Furthermore, the lack of relationships between ideology and our two measures of 
overconfident beliefs (overestimation and over-placement) suggest that conservatives do not 
actually overestimate their performance on exams (overestimation) or their abilities relative to 
others (over-placement) yet still have higher numeric efficacy and general self-efficacy. Thus, 
something besides overconfidence should be responsible for the greater self-efficacy of 
conservatives.  
One possibility is that the relationship between conservatism and general self-efficacy is 
driven by happiness. Past research shows that conservatives are generally happier than liberals 
(Schlenker & Chambers, 2012), and political orientation has proven to be a significant predictor 
of happiness (Bixter, 2015).  
Furthermore, happiness leads to increased thought confidence, which is defined as a 
belief in the accuracy of one’s own thoughts (Briñol et al., 2007; Petty et al., 2002). Therefore, if 
conservatives are happier than liberals, they may possess more confidence in themselves and 
their thoughts. Another study supports this conclusion. According to a 1988 review by Taylor 
and Brown, people who maintain high personal self-efficacy are happier and more productive 
even after negative or vague feedback. Thus, conservatives may be happier and have higher self-
efficacy.  
Additionally, one novel finding showed that higher levels of narcissism were associated 
with liberalism. This has not been thoroughly documented in previous literature, and past 
research has citied such an association with conservatism and the Dark Triad (Arvan 2013; 
Jonason, 2014). One study found equal levels of narcissism among conservatives and liberals 
and observed that the quality of each’s narcissism was different: conservative narcissism was 
more entitled while liberal narcissism was more exhibitionist (Hatemi & Fazekas, 2018). 
However, our analysis did not replicate this finding. The supplemental data includes more 
information regarding this issue (Table 13.)  
 There are some limitations to our study. First, the participants were taken from a 
convenience sample. The sample was generally White, educated, and liberal and therefore may 
not reflect the general American population. Second, some of our variables lacked specificity 
that could have revealed more nuance in our results. For instance, we only included a single scale 
of ideology (general political ideology) and did not include subtypes such as economic or social 
political identity. In Choma’s 2019 paper, they found numeracy was related to social 
conservatism and general conservative identity but not economic conservativism in their first 
sample. In their second sample, they found that social conservatism related to numeracy; 
however, economic, and overall political ideology did not significantly relate. It is possible that 
we would have similarly found social but not economic conservatism would predict lower ability 
and greater confidence.  
Despite these limitations, our findings contribute to a growing body of research that 
suggests a linear relationship between greater conservatism (vs. liberalism) and lower cognitive 
ability but higher self-confidence (Stankov 2009; Van Hiel et al., 2010; Choma et al., 2019). 
However, it is important to note that cognitive ability and confidence accounted for a very small 
portion of the variance, as also seen in Choma’s study, when predicting ideology. Furthermore, 
there is more variance within ideological groups than between them (see supplemental analyses).  
However, these small differences may still be impactful. For example, worse financial 
and medical decisions have been observed in those lower in numeric ability but higher numeric 
efficacy (Peters, et al. 2019). With financial decisions, this group were more likely to have filed 
for bankruptcy, foreclosures, and have unpaid taxes. Also those with higher numeric efficacy but 
lower ability and also suffering from Lupus, an autoimmune disorder, had worse medical 
outcomes and rarely predicted that their symptoms required increased medical attention when 
they in fact did.  
To relate these findings back to politics, increased efficacy or over precision in one’s 
beliefs, as seen with conservatives, leads to higher voter turnout (Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2015; 
Matsusaka, 1995). Thus, a small difference in efficacy could lead to thousands of more votes 
when aggregated across the country. In future research, it will be imperative to further 
investigate in which political contexts these differences manifest themselves and in which they 
are of greatest consequence. Furthermore, future research should examine cognitive ability and 
its relationship to specific policy endorsement. Likewise, a previous study has shown that 
political uncertainty leads to decreased political involvement (Vitriol, 2019). Therefore, future 
studies might consider investigating the relationship between cognitive ability, confidence, and 
political initiatives such as lobbying or online engagement. Perhaps cognitive ability and specific 
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Supplemental materials: ANOVA, descriptive statistics, & narcissism correlation  
ANOVA and Means 
Past research has made us suspect the relationship between ideology and cognitive ability 
may be curvilinear. For instance, one paper found that right and left extremist scored higher in 
verbal ability than moderates (Kemmelmeir 2008). We looked at the order of average cognitive 
ability scores to verify the direction of the effect. Our findings demonstrates that the order of 
means for cognitive ability were consistent with the linear effect of ideology. Liberals had the 
highest standarized score (M = 0.07), then moderates (M = -0.08), and conservaties scored the 
lowest (M = -.08) The same effect was found found with SNS and general self-efficacy. 
Although conservatives scored the lowest in cognitive ability, and they scored the highest in SNS 
and general self-efficacy thus driving the linear effect rather than moderates.   
Additionaly, we conducted ANOVA’s between cognitive ability, SNS, and general self-
efficacy to determine whether or not the average scores between groups were significantly 
different.  







Conservatives and liberals mean cognitive ability scores differed by (0.15), so there was 





 M N SD  
Conservative  -0.08 190 0.72  
Moderate -0.08 207 0.68  

















Table S3.  Cognitive Ability Tukey HSD Multiple Comparisons output for liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives. Variables are continuous. 
 
Tukey HSD   
(I) IDANOVA (J) IDANOVA 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Liberal Moderate .14809* .06042 .038 .0062 .2900 
Conservative .14918* .06222 .044 .0031 .2953 
Moderate Liberal -.14809* .06042 .038 -.2900 -.0062 
Conservative .00109 .07187 1.000 -.1676 .1698 
Conservative Liberal -.14918* .06222 .044 -.2953 -.0031 
Moderate -.00109 .07187 1.000 -.1698 .1676 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
However, there was a significant effect between cognitive ability and the three subsets of 
ideology at the p<.05 [F(2, 830) = 4.475, p = 0.012].  
Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test show that average scores for the 
conservative cognitive ability (M = -0.08, SD = 0.72) was significantly different than liberal 
cognitive ability (M = 0.07, SD = 0.73). Liberal cognitive ability was also significantly different 
 
Table S2.  Cognitive Ability ANOVA output comparing liberals, moderates, and 




Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.579 2 2.290 4.475 .012 
Within Groups 423.650 828 .512   
Total 428.230 830    
moderate cognitive ability (M = -0.08, SD = 0.73). There was no difference between moderate 
and conservative cognitive ability. 







Conservatives mean objective numeracy scores differed with moderate and liberals by a 
small amount (<0.20), so there was more variance within the groups than between them (SDs ≥ 
1.10).   






Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 5.157 2 2.579 2.097 .123 
Within Groups 1017.966 828 1.229   
Total 1023.123 830    
 
Table S6.  SNS Tukey HSD Multiple Comparisons output for liberals, moderates, and conservatives. 
Variables are continuous. 
 
Tukey HSD   
(I) Ideology  (J) Ideology  
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Liberal Moderate .00991 .09366 .994 -.2100 .2298 
Conservative -.18413 .09645 .137 -.4106 .0423 
Moderate Liberal -.00991 .09366 .994 -.2298 .2100 
 M N SD 
Moderate  4.36 207 1.12 
Liberal 4.37 434 1.11  
Conservative  4.55 190 1.10  
Conservative -.19404 .11140 .190 -.4556 .0675 
Conservative Liberal .18413 .09645 .137 -.0423 .4106 
Moderate .19404 .11140 .190 -.0675 .4556 
 
There were not significant differences between subjective numeracy and the three subsets 
of ideology at the p<.05 [F (2, 830) = 2.097, p = 0.123].  
Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test show that average scores for the liberal 
SNS (M = 4.37, SD = 1.11), moderate SNS (M = 4.36, SD = 1.12), and conservative SNS (M = 
4.55, SD = 1.10) were not significantly different.  
Table S7. General self-efficacy averages for conservatives, moderates, and liberals. Mean 






Conservatives and liberals mean general self-efficacy scores differed by a small amount 
(0.29), so there was more variance within the groups than between them (SDs ≥ 0.70).   
 
Table S8. General self-efficacy ANOVA output comparing liberals, moderates, 
and conservatives. 
 
General Self-Efficacy Average   
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 11.088 2 5.544 9.304 .000 
Within Groups 493.406 828 .596   
Total 504.494 830    
 
 
 M N SD 
Liberal  3.83 434 0.79 
Moderate 3.95 207 0.80 




Table S9.  General self-efficacy Tukey HSD Multiple Comparisons output for liberals, 
moderates, and conservatives. Variables are continuous. 
Tukey HSD   
(I) IDANOVA (J) IDANOVA 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Liberal Moderate -.12123 .06521 .151 -.2743 .0319 
Conservative -.28735* .06715 .000 -.4450 -.1297 
Moderate Liberal .12123 .06521 .151 -.0319 .2743 
Conservative -.16612 .07756 .082 -.3482 .0160 
Conservative Liberal .28735* .06715 .000 .1297 .4450 
Moderate .16612 .07756 .082 -.0160 .3482 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
There was a significant effect between general self-efficacy and the three subsets of 
ideology at the p<.05 [F (2, 830) = 9.304, p= 0.000].  
Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the 
conservative general self-efficacy (M = 4.12, SD = 0.70) was significantly different than liberal 
general self-efficacy (M = 3.83, SD = 0.79). However, moderate general self-efficacy (M = 3.95, 
SD = 0.80) did not significantly differ from moderate or conservative general self-efficacy.  
The mean comparison provides more context in the growing understanding of political 
ideology, cognitive ability, and efficacy. It provides strength to the argument that conservatives 
are overly efficacious yet rank lower in cognitive ability compared to their ideological 
counterparts.  
Also, it is important to mention that there is greater variance within ideological groups 
than between for cognitive ability, SNS, and general self-efficacy. These findings might be of 
interest considering the typical over perception of party differences. For example, political 
opposites are not as different in core values as expected (Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 2006), and 
partisans on both sides overestimate the extremity of opposing party views (Yudkin et al., 2019). 
Additionally, both liberals and conservatives engage in partisan bias (e.g., Ditto et al. 2019) such 
as endorsing (or rejecting) the same policy depending on whether their own party (or the other 
party) endorsed it (Cohen, 2003). Future studies might replicate this type of research but in the 
realm of ability and confidence; we would predict that people would underestimate the cognitive 
ability of their political opposites and overestimate their confidence. We also speculate that 
people might overestimate their own party’s alikeness, potentially underestimating the range of 
abilities found within their own political group. 
Narcissism and Political Ideology  
As mentioned, our research did not show a relationship between ideology and types of 
narcissism (exhibitionism & entitlement) (Hatemi & Fazekas, 2018). To explore this, we divided 
our narcissism scale into exhibitionist and entitled questions to see the relationship between these 
sub-variables and ideology. An exhibitionist would highly agree on a question such as “I tend to 
want others to admire me” while someone who is entitled might agree they “tend to expect 
special favors from others.”  However, we did not find correlations between either type of 
narcissism and ideology. This difference has several potential explanations. Unlike our study, 
Hatemi & Fazekas (2018) contained several different operationalization of ideology, such as 
including specific policy preferences. Once again, they found equal levels of narcissism across 
the political divide with liberal narcissism being exhibitionist while conservatives were more 
entitled. Given that they used both a regression and more diverse ideological subsets, this might 
explain why we were unable to replicate their findings.  
Table S10. Correlation table involving political ideology and types of narcissism. All variables 
are continuous. *p<.05. **p<.001. 
 
 Exhibition Entitlement Political ID 
 Exhibition  1 .652** -.058 
 Entitlement  .652** 1 -.048 
 Political ID -.058 -.048 1 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table S11. Descriptive table including confidence, cognitive ability, and political ideology. Mean, 













Political Ideology      1 5 2.58 1.12    
ONS      0 7 3.24 1.75  .70  
Ravens      0 10 5.58 1.78  .64  
Vocab      1 12 7.45 1.80   .45  
Cognitive Ability      -2.29 2.02 0.00 0.72    
Education      1 7 4.37 1.11    
SNS      1 6 4.41 1.11    
Overestimation ONS      -4 6 1.10 1.53    
Over-placement      0 100 50.8 24.34    
General Self-Eff.      1 5 3.93 0.78    
Narcissism     1  7 2.88 1.31  .85  
Psychopathology      1 7 2.31 1.17  .80  
Machiavellianism       1 7 2.46 1.25   .84  
